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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20050996-CA
vs.
MARK ALLEN GORDON,
Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e).

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain Gordon's convictions for

possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. "When
reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of evidence, [this Court] must sustain the trial
court's judgment unless it is against the clear weight of the evidence, or if the appellate
court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.' "
Spanish Fork City v Bryan, 1999 UT App 61, ^ 5, 975 P.2d 501 (citations omitted).
"However, 'before we can uphold a conviction it must be supported by a quantum of
evidence concerning each element of the crime as charged from which the [factfinder]
may base its conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.' " Id (citation omitted).
This issue was preserved in closing argument before the trial court (R. 79 137-42).
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CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
All necessary statutory and constitutional provisions are set forth in the Addenda.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A,

Nature of the Case
Mark Allen Gordon appeals from the judgment, sentence and commitment of the

Fourth District Court after he was convicted by Judge Claudia Laycock of possession of a
controlled substance in a drug-free zone, a second degree felony, and possession of drug
paraphernalia in a drug-free zone, a class A misdemeanor.

B.

Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition
Mark Allen Gordon was charged by amended Information filed in Fourth District

Court on July 22. 2005 with possession of a controlled substance in a drug-free zone, a
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i); and
possession of drug paraphernalia in a drug-free zone, a class A misdemeanor, in violation
of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37a-5(l) (R. 21).
On July 28, 2005 a preliminary hearing was held before Judge Claudia Laycock
and Gordon was bound-over for trial on both charges upon a finding of probable cause
(R. 23-24, 78).
On August 4, 2005 Gordon filed a motion to admit a statement against interest
made by Eric Wahlberg, pursuant to Rule 804(b)(3) of the Utah Rules of Evidence (R. 2732). Wahlberg was a co-defendant of Gordon. During a search of Wahlberg's vehicle an
Altoids tin containing crack cocaine was found by police. The Altoid tin was found in
close proximity to where Gordon was sitting in the back seat. Wahlberg subsequently
2

claimed ownership of the drugs to Officer Crook of the Orem Police Department.
Gordon sought admission of this statement made by Wahlberg on the grounds that: One,
Wahlberg would be unavailable to testify at trial due to Fifth Amendment constraints.
Two, that the statement subjected Wahlberg to criminal liability and a reasonable person
would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true. And three, that the
statement is corroberated to insure its truthfulness by the circumstances surrounding the
arrest.
On August 4, 2005 the State similarly filed a motion in limine to exclude
Wahlberg's statement of ownership (R. 34-42). The State's motion is in substance an
objection to Gordon's motion to admit (R. 43-44).
On August 15, 2005 an order of transport was signed by Judge Laycock which
ordered the Utah County Jail Transportation Officer to bring Eric Wahlberg from the Salt
Lake Detention Center to the Fourth District Court for trial on August 17, 2005 (R. 50).
A subpoena to appear and testify on that same date was also served upon Wahlberg at the
Salt Lake Detention Center (R. 51-52).
On August 17, 2005 a bench trial was held before Judge Laycock (R. 58-60, 79).
At trial, Wahlberg asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination (R.
60, 79:). After oral argument, Judge Laycock granted the State's motion in limine and
denied Gordon's motion for admission (R. 59, 79:). Judge Laycock found Gordon guilty
on both counts (R. 59, 79: ).
On October 13, 2005 Gordon was sentenced to 36-months probation and he was
ordered to serve 270 days in the Utah County Jail and to pay a fine (R. 66-68).
Gordon filed a notice of appeal in Fourth District Court on October 2L 2005 (R,
70). The notice of appeal inadvertantly referenced the Utah Supreme Court instead of
3

this Court (Id.). On October 31, 2005 the Utah Supreme Court transferred this appeal to
this Court (R. 71).

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
Trial Testimony
During trial the following evidence was introduced before Judge Laycock:
A. Testimony of William Crook
Crook is employed by the Orem City Police Department and is currently works in
the area of routine patrol (R. 79: 38). On July 9, 2005 Crook made personal contact with
Gordon during a traffic stop at approximately 9:45 p.m. (Id. at 38-39, 40). Crook had
been out on patrol when he ran a license plate on a vehicle in front of him at a red light
(Id. at 40). The license plate appeared to be expired and the check indicated that the
registered owner of the vehicle had a valid felony drug warrant for his arrest (Id. at 40-41,
58). As the light turned green, Crook activated his overhead lights and made a traffic
stop at the on-ramp of 1-15 at 1200 West and 800 North, which was measured to be 357
feet from a public commuter parking lot (Id. at 41, 56-57, 59). There were four
occupants in the vehicle (Id. at 43).
Crook testified that "as soon as I turned on the lights, [Gordon] made what I
described in my report as furtive movements" (Id. at 41). Specifically, "he turned slightly
to his right towards the center of the vehicle, his head turned, and kind of ducked down,
as if he was looking down... making movements as though we was hiding something" (Id.
at 41-42). Gordon was the left-side rear passenger (Id. at 42). As Crook approached the
vehicle Gordon had turned back forward and had his hands in his lap (Id. at 43), The
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furtive movements lasted 3-5 seconds and Crook could not see Gordon's hands (Id. at
59). Gordon was not wearing a seat belt (Id. at 56).
Crook testified that none of the other occupant's did anything "to raise [his]
awareness or alertness" but he couldn't testify with certainty that they didn't move (Id. at
60). Crook did not have the names or addresses of the other passengers because "they
were not arrested" although he was sure that he obtained their names or identification at
the scene (Id. at 96). Crook indicated that he may have questioned the other occupants
but it was just a basic, general conversation (Id. at 96-97). He "believe[d he] may have"
asked the others about the drugs "but [he] had no reason to believe it belonged to them, so
it was very slight, if there was any conversation. I don't recall" (Id. at 97).
Crook acknowledged that there was a video camera running in his patrol car but he
has never looked at it and wasn't sure if it recorded (Id. at 97). No photographs were
taken at the scene (Id. at 97).
Crook had the driver and the passengers exit the vehicle and searched the inside
(Id. at 43-44). During the search Crook located an Altoids tin in the backseat area "in the
exact location where I watched Mr. Gordon turn" (Id. at 44). Inside the Altoids tin was a
solid form of crack cocaine inside of two one inch baggies (Id. at 44-45). Crook
acknowledged that the other passenger could have accessed this area of the car (Id. at 61).
Crook did not recall finding any gloves or a hat in the vehicle; nor did he recall smelling
smoke of any kind (Id. at 69).
Crook confronted Gordon with the fact that he had located drugs in the car (Id. at
53). Gordon denied ownership or any knowledge of the drugs (Id. at 53). Gordon was
given his Miranda rights (Id. at 62). Gordon also told him that the driver had pre\ iously
been sitting in the back left seat where he was found to be sitting (Id. at 63).
5

Crook arrested Gordon for possession of a controlled substance (Id. at 53). He
didn't arrest the other passengers because they had no warrants and he didn't "have any
probable cause to believe they were ever in possession of any drugs or contraband" (Id. at
54). Crook arrested Gordon and transported him to the Utah County Jail (Id. at 54).
Gordon also denied ownership of the drugs on the way to the jail (Id. at 64).
At the jail, Gordon was "somewhat combative" during booking so he was placed
in a holding cell to the left of where Crook was writing his report (Id. at 54, 65). Around
this time, Crook overheard Gordon deny "any knowledge of the drugs, said he had never
possessed drugs, and then he mentioned specifically the word crack cocaine" (Id. at 54).
Gordon also told him that the driver had previously been sitting in the back left seat
where he was found to be sitting (Id. at 63).
Crook had testified previously that he didn't recall verbally identifying the drugs as
crack cocaine to the occupants of the vehicle but that he "didn't know" (Id. at 52, 62).
However, when asked this question subsequently, Crook also testified that he had not
identified the drug as crack cocaine; and that when he returned to the station the other
officers asked what kind of drugs had been located (Id. at 54-55, 64, 65). Crook testified
he confronted Gordon at the jail about the drugs being crack cocaine and that Gordon
"didn't respond. He was just quiet at that point" whereas he had been upset before (Id. at
55).
Crook spoke with Gordon for approximately 45 minutes and yet the only notation
he made in his report about the conversation was a single sentence (Id. at 123). Crook
acknowledged that the questions from Gordon as to whether the drugs were "marijuana"
or "some other drugs" were made on the way to the jail rather than at the jail (Id. at 124).
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After the search, the vehicle was not seized and one of the other passengers drove
it from the scene (Id. at 100).
A partial finger print from the Altoids tin was sent to the Utah State Crime Lab (Id.
at 68). However, no match was made by the lab (Id.). The substance in the tin was also
tested by the lab and came back positive as cocaine (Id. at 70).
B. Testimony of Officer Jeff Bailey
Jeff Bailey is also employed as a police officer with Orem City (R. 79: 71-72).
Bailey assisted on the July 9, 2005 traffic stop (Id. at 72). When Bailey arrived, Officer
Ruiz was already there assisting Crook (Id. at 73). The occupants of the vehicle were
already outside the vehicle and were on the passenger side of Crook's patrol car (Id. at 73,
74). The driver was already in custody (Id. at 73). Two men were located in front of the
right front tire (Id. at 76). Gordon was also standing in the same general area (Id. at 76).
Bailey had a light-hearted conversation with the other two individuals and Gordon for 4-8
minutes (Id. at 76-77, 78, 80). Bailey did not personally observe any contraband from the
suspect vehicle; and he did not know what type of drugs was located until Crook told him
it was crack cocaine back at the station (Id. at 78-79).
C. Testimony of Officer Orlando Ruiz
Orlando Ruiz is a patrol officer with the Orem Police Department (R. 79: 81). On
July 9, 2005 he assisted on a traffic stop as back-up (Id. at 82-83). Ruiz was present
when the driver was taken into custody and he assisted in the search of the vehicle from
the driver's side (Id. at 83). An opened Altoids tin was found loosely fitted underneath
between the seat back and the seat cushion of the rear driver's side seat after the seat was
lifted up (Id. at 84, 88-90, 91). Ruiz testified that the occupant of that seat could have
easily had access to it (Id. at 89-90). But anybody at anytime could have put the tin in
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there and that it might have been easier to put it there by standing up and lifting the seat
(Id. at 90). The back seat of the vehicle is a bench type seat and when Ruiz arrived at the
scene there was someone sitting on the seat on the other side (Id. at 92).
When Crook opened the tin, Ruiz noticed baggies inside but couldn't tell the
nature of the substance inside the baggies (Id. at 84). Ruiz testified that Crook did not
identify to him what the substance was at the scene (Id. at 84-85). Ruiz was told by
Crook that the substance was crack cocaine later back at the station (Id. at 85). Ruiz
testified that he knew "there was alcohol involved" and that all of the occupants except
the driver had been drinking "a large amount, so they were under the influence of
alcohol" and/or narcotics (Id. at 87). Gordon's eyes were glazed and he smelled heavily
of alcohol (Id. at 88).
D. Testimony of Mark Gordon
On July 9, 2005 Gordon was at the Salt Lake County Jail as he had been arrested
for public intoxication (R. 79: 101-02). He was bailed out by a friend, Sean, who was
also one of the occupants in the car at the time it was stopped (Id. at 102). He was able to
get home through Eric Wahlberg, who Gordon had not met but who was a friend of Sean
(Id. at 102). Gordon was living in Salt Lake and working at Big D Construction (Id. at
102-03).
When Gordon got into Wahlberg's vehicle he noticed the Altoids tin because the
"officer at the jail told me that, you know, I kind of smelled like alcohol. And that's what
the Altoid can had caught my attention because I really needed something for my breath
at the time" (Id. at 103). It was sitting in the front on the dashboard on the passenger side
(Id. at 119). He did not ask for a mint and he doesn't know where the tin was located on
the drive to Provo (Id. at 119).
8

Gordon spoke with Sean and told him that he needed to get to Provo to pick up his
car keys because he was afraid it might get impounded from where it was parked at the
Gateway in downtown Salt Lake (Id. at 102, 104). Sean asked Wahlberg to drive to
Provo and provided him with money for gas (Id. at 105).
Gordon testified that he actually drove the car to Provo as Wahlberg "didn't feel
like driving" (Id. at 105). Wahlberg was seated behind him (Id. at 106). Sean was sitting
in the other passenger seat and Rodney Jackson, another friend of Gordon's was sitting in
the front passenger seat (Id. at 106). When they arrived at the motel where Gordon
thought the lady friend of his was at, the manager indicated that he hadn't heard of the
person (Id. at 107). When they got back into the car, Wahlberg got in the driver's seat
with Sean seated next to him and Gordon and Jackson in the back seat (Id. at 107).
Gordon was in the rear left seat (Id. at 107). When they arrived at the correct motel, they
were told by another friend that the woman they were looking for wasn't there (Id. at
108). So they got back into the car to return to the free way (Id. at 108). On the way they
stopped at a convenience store and picked up some cigarettes and Gordon purchased a
pack of beer, which he put in the trunk (Id. at 108). Afterwards they were stopped by
police as they went to enter the freeway (Id. at 108).
Once they were stopped, Gordon took off his hat and set it on his right knee "and
that's when the officer came over and started talking to Eric, and Sean in the front seat.
He had some chips. He (Wahlberg) offered me some chips, did I want some chips. I
accepted some chips" (Id. at 108-09). As he put down his hat, he may have looked
around towards the police car (Id. at 117-18). He was not wearing a seatbelt (Id. at 118).
After the officers spoke with Wahlberg, they asked him for identification and he
reached into his back pocket and gave one of the officer's his driver's license (Id. at 109).
9

After the officers returned from running a check on the licenses, they returned and
informed them that Wahlberg had a warrant (Id. at 109). The officers asked all of them to
step out of the car and they were taken to the patrol car and one of the officers was talking
to them (Id. at 109-10).
When they were at the patrol car, one of the officer's came behind him and witold
me I was under arrest for controlled substance, a felony controlled substance" (Id. at 110).
He was read his Miranda rights, handcuffed, and placed inside the patrol car (Id. at 110).
Gordon testified that he denied knowing anything about the drugs (Id. at 110, 111). He
was transported from the scene and he was told by one of the officer's "that if your
fingerprints is on this paraphernalia. I guess the tin can, you know, the charge is going to
be on you" (Id. at 111). Gordon indicated that he told them to test it (Id. at 111).
Gordon was upset when they arrived at the jail because the officers wouldn't listen
to him when he denied knowledge of the drugs (Id. at 111-12). Gordon refused to give
Crook his social security number so he was put in a lockup cell (Id. at 112-13). Gordon
yelled from the cell, telling the officer that the drugs weren't his and asking him what
kind of drugs were found (Id. at 113). Gordon testified that he received no answers to his
questions and that the officer "just kept typing" (Id. at 113).
Gordon denied knowing that the drugs were crack cocaine or to have ever making
a statement which specified crack cocaine (Id. at 114). Gordon testified that he didn't
learn that the drugs were crack cocaine until he came to court for a first appearance (Id. at
114).
Gordon indicated that he'd had one beer before the vehicle was stopped but that
he'd been up all night at the jail and he'd had "a lot to drink" that Friday night (Id. at 11516). Gordon felt sick at the time of the stop but not intoxicated (Id at 116).
10

Argument and Findings Concerning Sufficiency of the Evidence
During closing argument Gordon argued that the evidence was insufficient to
establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed a controlled substance and
paraphernalia (R. 79: 137-42).
The trial court found the following (R. 79: 146-50):
1.

Wahlberg's vehicle was stopped between 9:45 and 10:00 pm on July 9, 2005 in

Orem for having an expired registration tag. Wahlberg also had a felony drug warrant for
his arrest.
2.

Immediately prior to the stop, Officer Crook activated his overhead lights and his

spotlight which shone into the back of Wahlberg's vehicle.
3.

While the spotlight was shining on the vehicle, Crook saw Gordon in the back left

seat twist to his right, look slightly down and lean over slightly towards the center of the
vehicle. He did not see him remove a hat. He did not see him reach forward
subsequently to take some chips from the driver.
4.

When Crook approached the vehicle, Gordon's hands were in his lap and he

wasn't eating any chips.
5.

Crook and Ruiz searched the vehicle and located an Altoid tin with crack cocaine

between the upright cushion and the seat cushion when they lifted the backseat cushion.
They had to lift the seat to get it out. Its location was directly to Gordon's right and was
within his reach, consistent with Crook's observation as to Gordon twisting to his right.
6.

On the way to the jail Gordon poses many questions as to what drugs were found.

At the jail, Gordon told Crook that the crack cocaine was not his.
7.

Ruiz testified that Gordon's eyes were glazed and that he smelled heavily of

alcohol.
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Accordingly, the trial court concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that "defendant
did exercise dominion and control over the contents of the Altoids box when he took the
box and hid it in the seat, and I do find that he took the box and hid it in the seat next to
him" (Id. at'l50).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Gordon asks that this Court reverse his convictions for possession of a controlled
substance and drug paraphernalia because the evidence was insufficient to establish that
he possessed or constructively possessed those items.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THAT GORDON
POSSESSED A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE AND DRUG PARAPHERNALIA
Gordon asserts that the evidence was sufficient to sustain his convictions for
possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. "'When
reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of evidence, [this Court] must sustain the trial
court's judgment unless it is against the clear weight of the evidence, or if the appellate
court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.' "
Spanish Fork City v. Bryan, 1999 UT App 61, f 5, 975 P.2d 501 (citations omitted).
"However, 'before we can uphold a conviction it must be supported by a quantum of
evidence concerning each element of the crime as charged from which the [factfinder]
may base its conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.' " Id. (citation omitted).
12

For Gordon to be convicted of possession of a controlled substance and possession
of drug paraphernalia, it was necessary for the State to prove beyond an reasonable doubt
that he ^knowingly and intentionally possessed] or use[d] a controlled substance.'' Utah
Code Annotated § 58-37-8(2)(a)(I). Similarly to convict him of possession of drug
paraphernalia the State would have to prove that he "possessed] with intent to use drug
paraphernalia." Utah Code Annotated § 58-37a-5(l). Gordon asserts that the Altoid tin
which was the basis of the paraphernalia charge is only paraphernalia because it was used
to store cocaine. Without the presence of the cocaine, it would not constitute
paraphernalia. Likewise, because cocaine was found inside it is of necessity7 drug
paraphernalia. So if Gordon was properly convicted of possessing cocaine then he is
guilty of possession of drug paraphernalia. However, he asserts that the evidence was
insufficient to convict him of either charge. Specifically, he asserts that the convictions
are not supported by a quantum of evidence concerning the possession element of the
crimes.
During closing argument Gordon argued that the evidence was insufficient to
establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed a controlled substance and
paraphernalia (R. 79: 137-42).
The trial court found the following (R. 79: 146-50):
1.

Wahlberg's vehicle was stopped between 9:45 and 10:00 pm on July 9, 2005 in

Orem for having an expired registration tag. Wahlberg also had a felony drug warrant for
his arrest.
2.

Immediately prior to the stop, Officer Crook activated his overhead lights and his

spotlight which shone into the back of Wahlberg's vehicle.
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3.

While the spotlight was shining on the vehicle, Crook saw Gordon in the back left

seat twist to his right, look slightly down and lean over slightly towards the center of the
vehicle. He did not see him remove a hat. He did not see him reach forward
subsequently to take some chips from the driver.
4.

When Crook approached the vehicle, Gordon's hands were in his lap and he

wasn't eating any chips.
5.

Crook and Ruiz searched the vehicle and located an Altoid tin with crack cocaine

between the upright cushion and the seat cushion when they lifted the backseat cushion.
They had to lift the seat to get it out. Its location was directly to Gordon's right and was
within his reach, consistent with Crook's observation as to Gordon twisting to his right.
6.

On the way to the jail Gordon poses many questions as to what drugs were found.

At the jail, Gordon told Crook that the crack cocaine was not his.
7.

Ruiz testified that Gordon's eyes were glazed and that he smelled heavily of

alcohol.
Accordingly, the trial court concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that ''defendant
did exercise dominion and control over the contents of the Altoids box when he took the
box and hid it in the seat, and I do find that he took the box and hid it in the seat next to
him" (Id. at 150).
Gordon has marshaled the evidence in his statement of the facts. In this case the
entire basis for the trial court's conviction is as follows: Officer Crook observed Gordon,
who was seated in the rear left seat, for 3-5 seconds twist to his right, look down slightly
and lean forward towards the center of the back seat (R. 79: 41-43). Crook believed
Gordon "was hiding something" (Id. at 42). During a subsequent search of the vehicle, an
Altoid tin with crack cocaine was located between the seat back and the seat cushion in
14

the middle of the back seat (Id. at 44-45). The seat had to be lifted up before the Altoid
tin was discovered (Id. at 84, 88-90, 91). Both officers testified that the other rear seat
passenger could have easily had access to the tin (Id. at 61, 89-90). Officer Crook
testified that Gordon denied knowledge or ownership of the drugs (Id. at 53). On the way
to the jail, Gordon asked Crook what kind of drugs were found (Id. at 124). However,
Crook testified that Gordon told him at the jail that he didn't know about or possess the
crack cocaine (Id. at 54). Crook seemed to testify both that he didn't know if he verbally
had specified that the drugs were crack cocaine and that he never verbally stated it was
crack cocaine (Id. at 52, 62; 54-55, 64, 65). Both assisting officers testified that they did
not learn that the drugs were cocaine until later back at the station (Id. at 78-79, 85).
Gordon asserts that the trial court's finding that he possessed a controlled
substance and drug paraphernalia because "he took and hid it in the seat next to him*' (Id.
at 150), is based solely on circumstantial evidence that somehow his twisting movement
to his right, leaning forward and looking down slightly necessarily means he had the
Altoid tin in his hand and he was seeking to hide it. The Utah Supreme Court has held:
"When, as here, the evidence consists solely of undisputed, circumstantial evidence, the
role of the reviewing court is to determine (1) whether there is any evidence that supports
each and every element of the crime charged, and (2) whether the inferences that can be
drawn from that evidence have a basis in logic and reasonable human experience
sufficient to prove each legal element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt"" State v
Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 985 (Utah 1993) (emphasis added). See also State v. Brown,
948 P.2d 337, 345 (Utah 1997). Moreover, "[w]here the only evidence presented against
the defendant is circumstantial, the evidence supporting a conviction must preclude every
reasonable hypothesis of innocence. This is because the existence of a reasonable
15

hypothesis of innocence necessarily raises a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt."
State v. Hill 727 P.2d 221, 222 (Utah 1986) (plurality opinion) (citing State v. Romero,
554 P.2d 216, 219 (Utah 1976)).
Gordon asserts that the trial court's finding that he possessed a controlled
substance and drug paraphernalia is not based on an inference that has a basis in logic and
reasonable human experience sufficient to prove that he was, in fact, holding the Altoid
tin beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, this inference made by the trial court does not
preclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Specifically, this inference ignores
the following: One, that the vehicle was owned by Wahlberg (Id. at 40-41, 58, 7). Two,
that their were four people in the car and that they all traded places part way through the
journey (Id. at 105-07, 130). Three, that both of the officers who conducted the search of
the vehicle testified that the other rear seat passenger could easily have had access to the
tin (Id. at 6K 89-90). Accordingly, Gordon asserts that there was insufficient
evidence-based on a logical and reasonable inference that precludes every existence of a
reasonable hypothesis of innocence, to satisfy the requirement that there exist a quantum
of evidence of each element of the crime.
Moreover, the evidence was insufficient to establish that he constructively
possessed drug paraphernalia or a controlled substance. "A person who does not have
actual physical possession may still be convicted, however, if the State can prove
constructive possession." State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 131-32 (Utah 1987). To find
Gordon had constructive possession of the cocaine or paraphernalia, the State had "Ho
prove that there was a sufficient nexus between the accused and the drug to permit and
inference that the accused had both the power and the intent to exercise dominion and
control over the drug." State v. Workman, 2005 UT 66,1J31, 122 P.3d 639. Such a
16

determination depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. Id. (citing State v.
Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 319 (Utah 1985)).
In Workman, the Utah Supreme Court cited to several factors that may be
important in the determination of whether a sufficient nexus exists "including ownership
and/or occupancy of the residence or vehicle where the drugs were found, presence of
defendant at the time the drugs were found, defendant's proximity to the drugs, previous
drug use, incriminating statements or behavior, presence of drugs in a specific area where
the defendant had control, etc." Workman, 2005 UT 66 at % 32. Moreover in Workman
the Utah court also noted: "We have previously held that many of these factors, by
themselves, are insufficient to establish the requisite nexus. See Fox, 709 P.2d at 320
(holding that co-occupancy of a house where marijuana was being grown, absent other
evidence, was insufficient to establish a nexus); Anderton, 668 P.2d at 1264 (holding that
co-ownership and co-occupancy of a home were insufficient to establish a nexus); see
also Spanish Fork City v Bryan, 1999 UT App 61, ^ 2, 10, 975 P.2d 501 (holding that
co-occupancy of bedroom where drug paraphernalia was found was insufficient to
establish a nexus); State v Salas, 820 P.2d 1386, 1389 (Utah Ct.App.1991) (holding that
ownership and co-occupancy of a vehicle, along with an anonymous informant's tip. was
insufficient to establish a nexus).7' Workman, 2005 UT 66 at f 33.
In this case, Gordon asserts that there is not a sufficient nexus between him and the
drugs to support a conclusion that he had both the power and the intent to exercise
dominion and control over the drugs. One, the vehicle was owned by Wahlberg who was
arrested on a felony drug warrant. Two, while Gordon was found in close proximity to the
drugs so was the other back seat passenger. In addition, the driver and the other passenger
had likewise recently been seated in the back seat. Three, there was no evidence that
17

Gordon had any prior history with drugs. Four, Gordon denied having any knowledge or
association with the drugs. Accordingly, Gordon asserts that like the above-referenced
cases the fact that he momentarily turned to the right and looked down is insufficient
incriminating behavior in light of all the other evidence to establish a sufficient nexus.
Furthermore, the fact that Gordon was aware of the existence of the Altoids tin
because he'd seen it previously on the front dashboard, or even as Crook testified that he
must have known that it contained crack cocaine, is insufficient to establish possession
"Knowledge and ability to possess do not equal possession where there is no evidence of
intent to make use of that knowledge and ability." Spanish Fork v Bryan, 1999 UT 61,
975 P.2d 501, 503 (citations omitted). Accordingly, the evidence "must raise a reasonable
inference that [Gordon] was engaged in a criminal enterprise and not simply a bystander."
Id Gordon asserts that there is no such evidence present here.
Accordingly, Gordon asks that this Court reverse his convictions for possession of a
controlled substance and drug paraphernalia because the evidence was insufficient to
establish that he possessed or constructively possessed those items.

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
Gordon requests that this Court reverse his convictions for possession of a
controlled substance, a second degree felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class
A misdemeanor because the evidence was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable
doubt that he committed these offenses.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 7th day of August, 2006. ^
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Margaret r . Lindsay
Counsel for Appellant
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58-37a-4

OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS

(4) Testing equipment used, oi intended foi use, to
identify 01 to analyze the strength, effectiveness, or
purity of a controlled substance,
(5) Scales and balances used, oi intended foi use,
in weighing oi measuring a controlled substance,
(6) Diluents and adulterants, such as quinine hydrochloride, mannitol, manmted, dextrose and lactose, used, or intended for use to cut a controlled
substance,
(7) Separation gins and sifters used, oi intended
for use to remove twigs, seeds, or othei impurities
from m a n h u a n a ,
(8) Blenders, bowls, containers, spoons and mixing
devices used, oi intended foi use to compound a
controlled substance,
(9) Capsules, balloons, envelopes, and other contamers used, or intended for use to package small
quantities of a controlled substance,
(10) Containers and other objects used oi m
tended for use to store or conceal a conti oiled sub
stance,
(11) Hypodermic syringes, needles, and other objects used, or intended for use to parenterally inject a
controlled substance into the human body, and
(12* Objects used, or intended for use to ingest,
inhale or otherwise introduce marihuana, cocaine,
hashish, or hashish oil into the human bod\ includ
ing but not limited to
(a) Metal, wooden, acrylic, glass, stone, plastic, or ceramic pipes with or without screens,
permanent screens, hashish heads, or punctured
metal bowls,
(b) Water pipes,
(c) Carburetion tubes and devices,
(d) Smoking and carburetion masks,
(e) Roach clips meaning objects used to hold
burning material, such as a marihuana cigarette,
that has become too small or too short to be held
in the hand,
(f) Miniature cocaine spoons and cocaine vi
als,
(g) Chamber pipes
(h) Carburetor pipes,
(l) Electric pipes,
(j) Air-driven pipes,
(k) Chillums,
(1) Bongs, and
(m) Ice pipes or chillers
iwi
58-37av4.

C o n s i d e r a t i o n s in d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r obj e c t is d r u g p a r a p h e r n a l i a .
In determining whether an object is drug paraphernaha, the
trier of fact, m addition to all other logically relevant factors,
should consider
(1) statements by an owner or by anyone in control of
t h e object concerning its use,
(2) prior convictions, if any, of an ownei oi of anyone in
control of the object, under any state oi federal law
relating to a controlled substance,
(3) the proximity of the object, m time and space, to a
direct violation of this chapter,
(4) the proximity of the object to a controlled substance,
(5) the existence of any residue of a controlled substance on the object,
(6) instructions whether oral or w n t t e n piovided with
the object concerning its use,
(7) descriptive materials accompanying the object
^ hich explain or depict its use,
(8) national and local advertising concerning its use,
(9) the mannei in which the object is displayed foi sale
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(10) w hethei the owner oi anyone in control oi the
object is a legitimate supplier of like or related items to
the community, such as a licensed distributoi or dealer of
tobacco products,
(11) direct or circumstantial evidence of the ratio o|
sales of the object to the total sales of the business
enterprise,
(12) the existence and scope of legitimate uses of thf
object in the community, and
(13) expert testimony concei ning its use
19^,
58-37a*5. Unlawful a c t s .
(1) H is unlawful for a m person to use, oi to possess with
intent to use, drug paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, pro
duce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store
contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a
controlled substance into the human body m violation of this
chapter Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a
class B misdemeanor
(2) It is unlawful for any peison to dehvei, possess with
intent to deliver, or manufacture with intent to deliver, any
drug paraphernalia, knowing that the drug paraphernalia will
be used to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test,
analyze5 pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest,
inhale, oi otherwise introduce a controlled substance into the
human body m violation of this act An}7 person who violates
this subsection is guilty of a class A misdemeanor
(3) Any person 18 years of age or over who delivers drug
paraphernalia to a person under 18 years of age who is three
years oi- more younger than the person making the delivery is
guilty of a third degree felony
(4) It is unlawful for any person to place in this state m any
newspaper, magazine, handbill, or other publication any advertisement, knowing that the purpose of the advertisement is
to pron\ote the sale of drug paraphernaha Any person who
violates this subsection is guilt\ of a class B misdemeanor
58-37a-6. S e i z u r e — F o r f e i t u r e — P r o p e r t y rights.
Drug paraphernalia is subject to seizure and forfeiture in
accordance with the procedures and substantive protections of
Title 24, Chapter 1, Utah Uniform Forfeiture Procedures Act
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